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1. Introduction
The European Commission published guidance on its enforcement priorities in applying Article 82
to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings in December 2008. These guidelines
attempt to present an economic and effects-based approach to evaluate the effects of various
business practices, which could qualify as an abuse of a dominant market position. Price dis-
crimination is one of the major business practices under scrutiny in these guidelines. Our study
presents an effects-based evaluation of history-based price discrimination by conducting a welfare
analysis of such a business practice. In particular, we will compare the effects of history-based
price discrimination for consumer surplus and industry profits with those associated with uniform
pricing.
It has become common practice in many industries, for example, cable TV, telecommunica-
tion, service industries and energy industries, to apply history-based price discrimination, i.e. to
differentiate the prices directed to old and new customers. Typically new customers are targeted
by aggressive price offers (introductory offers or poaching prices), which are designed to attract
new customers or to induce rival firms’ customers to switch even when those customers are
already locked-in in another customer relationship. In this study we will conduct a welfare anal-
ysis of history-based price discrimination within the framework of an asymmetric duopoly model
where the dominant firm as well as its small rival can apply history-based pricing. We address the
following questions: Can history-based pricing be viewed as an instrument for a dominant firm to
induce exclusion of smaller rivals? Does it prevent competition on the merits, thereby preventing
consumers from enjoying the benefits of competition? Does history-based pricing make domi-
nance persistent? And most importantly, which are precisely the effects of history-based pricing
for consumer surplus and total welfare?
Competition lawyers and judges tend to view history-based price discrimination conducted
by dominant firm, as any form of discrimination, in a rather skeptical, if not resentful, way
(e.g. Mo¨schel (1999)). Such a view has often been based on a form-based approach to the
implementation of competition law. A number of European antitrust cases have established how
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history-based price discrimination might facilitate predation in a way which would, according to
competition authorities or courts, qualify as an abuse of a dominant market position. The ECS-
AKZO case1 is the seminal case exemplifying this. AKZO directed poaching prices to ECS’s
customers with the intention of excluding ECS from the market. Spector (2005) presents a
thorough discussion of this aspect. Another example is the Irish Sugar case, where the dominant
firm applied a scheme of target rebates such that the rebate was more favorable to particular
customers of competing sugar packers. The Swedish Competition Authority vs. TeliaSonera from
year 2005 is still another example illustrating how selective poaching offers by a dominant firm to
a small rival’s customers may qualify as an abuse of market dominance. In this case TeliaSonera
directed selective poaching offers exclusively to customers of Bredbandsbolaget, a small regional
rival in the Swedish market for fixed line telecommunications.2 For an extensive and systematic
account of European competition law towards price discrimination we refer to Geradin and Petit
(2005).
In this study we adopt a standard Hotelling model to analyze the effects of history-based price
discrimination in asymmetric industries, where one of the firms is assumed to have a dominant
market position. We focus on a duopoly industry endowed with an inherited position of domi-
nance, where, for simplicity, dominance is assumed to mean a market share larger than 50%.3 We
find that uniform pricing is a more efficient instrument than history-based pricing for the dominant
firm to defend its market share advantage. We show that consumers benefit from history-based
price discrimination unless the switching cost is sufficiently high. The switching cost threshold,
above which consumers benefit from uniform pricing, depends on whether the inherited domi-
nance is weak or strong. However, uniform pricing softens competition in the duopolistic industry
leading to higher industry profits under uniform pricing. Consequently, unless the switching costs
are sufficiently large, a ban on history-based price discrimination would redistribute surplus from
1European Commission Decision 85/609 of 14 December 1985, ECS/Akzo, OJ L 374 of 31 December 1985,
1–27.
2Stockholm District Court Case 28 October 2005 Dnr 873/2005.
3Of course, in competition law there is a general verbal characterization of market dominance. For example,
the European Commission defines dominance to be a position of economic strength making it possible for the
dominant undertaking to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, its customers and
ultimately of its consumers.
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consumers to producers. Finally, we establish that the gains to industry profits associated with
uniform pricing under all circumstances exceed the associated losses to consumers.
Our study has strong implications for competition policy, not only with respect to the imple-
mentation of Article 82 in Europe but also in light of US Section 2 of the Clayton Act, which
renders any activity that aims at substantially eliminating competition or creating a monopoly as
illegal per se. We find that a policy of banning history-based price discrimination leads to higher
prices in most consumer segments, and, therefore, tends to reduce overall consumer surplus.
Moreover, a ban on price history-based discrimination tends to soften competition and promote
industry profits.
Our study is structured as follows: Section 2 presents a short literature review and identifies
our contribution to this literature. The analytical part of our study is divided into three sections.
Section 3 presents a detailed equilibrium analysis of competition with history-based pricing. Sec-
tion 4 characterizes the equilibrium with uniform pricing. Section 5 evaluates the implications for
welfare of history-based pricing. Section 6 concludes.
2. Literature Review
With monopoly, price discrimination is a pricing instrument whereby the monopolist can shift
surplus from the consumers in order to promote its profits. As shown initially by Thisse and
Vives (1988), the consequences of price discrimination change dramatically in an oligopoly. They
demonstrate that when firms compete strategically with completely individualized prices (perfect
price discrimination) competition is intensified relative to the outcome of competition with uniform
prices, but they do not focus on history-based price discrimination.
In industries with switching costs firms have strategic incentives to establish business relation-
ships. The business relationships are profitable because firms can exploit locked-in customers up
to a limit determined by the switching costs. With history-based price discrimination firms poach
their rivals’ customers with competitive poaching offers, which are sufficiently much lower than
the prices charged to loyal customers. However, the prices charged to both customer categories
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are below the equilibrium prices with uniform price schemes. Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) is
a seminal contribution for a general analysis of behavior-based pricing, whereas Chen (1997),
Taylor (2003), and Gehrig and Stenbacka (2004, 2007) present applications or more specialized
symmetric duopoly models of this type.4 The potential abuse of a dominant market position
is not really an issue unless we focus on an asymmetric industry structure, where one firm is
equipped with a dominant position. Contrary to the literature cited above, we therefore focus on
an asymmetric industry structure with inherited dominance and explore the welfare implications
of history-based pricing.
Chen (2008) presents a dynamic model of how behavior-based pricing by a dominant firm may
facilitate predation based on exit of a small rival. Chen conducts the analysis with an arbitrary
time horizon and with a segmented market such that firms do not compete head-to-head when
they apply uniform pricing and he characterizes the dynamic price equilibria and some welfare
properties. Compared with Chen (2008), in this study we conduct a complete welfare analysis of
history-based price discrimination in an asymmetric Hotelling model such that the loyal segment
of the dominant firm’s market is endogenously determined.
Our study is also related to a recent literature exploring the effects of price discrimination
on entry. Armstrong and Vickers (1993), Cheung and Wang (1999), and Bouckaert, Degryse,
and van Dijk (2007) study important welfare effects of policies with bans on price discrimination
by dominant firms. These studies focus on price discrimination within a framework where the
dominant firm operates in an exogenously determined sheltered segment as well as a segment
subject to competition. Relatedly, Gehrig, Shy, and Stenbacka (2010) design a Hotelling model
to analyze the effect of history-based price discrimination on entry in a configuration where the
entrant has no access to information about consumers’ purchase histories. Within such a context
they conduct a welfare analysis of history-based price discrimination. Contrary to that study,
here we conduct the welfare analysis of history-based price discrimination within the context of
an asymmetric duopoly model where both the dominant firm and the small rival have access to
4Fudenberg and Villas-Boas (2007) present an updated survey on the literature focusing on behavior-based
price discrimination.
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information about consumers’ purchase histories.
3. History-based Price Discrimination
We focus on horizontally differentiated firms. The firms compete with respect to history-based
pricing schemes. We focus on competition in an asymmetric duopoly where the dominant firm
has inherited either weak (Section 3.1) or strong (Section 3.2) dominance to be defined below.
Firms A and B produce differentiated brands. Firm A (B) is located on the left (right) side
of the unit interval. Consumers are uniformly distributed on the the unit interval according to
increased preference for brand B (decreased preference for A). Each consumer x, x ∈ [0, 1], is
endowed with a purchase history known to the firms. There are two periods labeled t = 0 and
t = 1. Let the function h(x) : [0, 1]→ {A,B} describe the purchase history of each consumer x.
Thus, h(x) = A (h(x) = B) implies that the consumer indexed by x has purchased brand A (B)
in period t = 0. Each consumer buys one unit from one of the firms in period t = 1.
Let c denote the unit production cost of firms A and B. Let pA denote the price firm A sets
for consumers who have already purchased brand A before, and qA the price for those consumers
who earlier purchased brand B (the competing brand). Firm B’s prices, pB and qB, are defined
analogously. We interpret pA and pB as the prices for loyal consumers, whereas qA and qB are
poaching prices.
Consumers bear an exogenous cost σ when switching from one brand to another. The utility
of a consumer indexed by x with a purchase history of brand h(x) ∈ {A,B} is defined by
U(x)
def
=

β − pA − τx if h(x) = A and continues to purchase brand A
β − qB − τ(1− x)− σ if h(x) = A and now switches to brand B
β − pB − τ(1− x) if h(x) = B and continues to purchase brand B
β − qA − τx− σ if h(x) = B and now switches to brand A.
(1)
The first and third rows in (1) define the utility gained by customers who are loyal to A and B,
respectively. The second and fourth rows define the utility gained by switching consumers.
The parameter β measures the consumer’s basic satisfaction. The parameter τ ≥ 0 is the
“transportation cost” parameter. A low value of τ will be interpreted as intense brand competition.
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The brand switching cost σ captures, for example, network externalities, compatibility, or learning
costs.
Let x0 be given. We focus on a purchase history such that all consumers indexed by x ≤ x0
(x > x0) belong to A’s (B’s) inherited market share. Formally, h(x) = A for all x ≤ x0 whereas
h(x) = B for all x > x0. With no loss of generality we assume that x0 > 0.5 which we take
to mean that firm A is dominant. Throughout the present duopoly study we make the simple
interpretation that a firm is dominant if it has a market share exceeding 50%.5 Figure 1 illustrates
how the history of purchases relates to current brand preferences.
- x
0 1x01
2
Purchased brand A Purchased B
A-oriented B-oriented -ﬀ-ﬀ
Figure 1: Characterization of purchase history.
In order to induce some consumers to switch brands we make the following assumption.
Assumption 1. The switching cost is lower than the transportation cost parameter. Formally,
σ < τ .
We now classify purchase history as follows.
Definition 1. We say that the purchase history x0 exhibits weak dominance if 0.5 < x0 <
x¯0 = (3τ − σ)/(4τ) and strong dominance if x0 ≥ x¯0 .
Figure 2 illustrates an equilibrium allocation of consumers under weak dominance. The left
segment in Figure 2 illustrates consumers who are loyal to brand A. These consumers pay a price
of pA. The second segment from the left is the range of consumers who previously purchased A
and have been attracted by firm B at its poaching price qB. The third range of consumers are
5Note that the legal characterization of market dominance, for example in European competition law, does
not necessarily refer only to market share.
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Figure 2: Consumer allocation between horizontally-differentiated brands under weak dominance.
Note: Arrows indicate consumers’ choice in each segment.
those who switch from B to A and thus pay the price qA. The fourth range of consumers are
those who are loyal to brand B and pay a price of pB.
In contrast to Figure 2, Figure 3 illustrates this configuration under strong dominance. Strong
-
xA1
0
x
A← A A→ B
pA qBA
1
h(x) = Aﬀ
x0
h(x) = B-
B → B
pB B
Figure 3: Consumer allocation between horizontally-differentiated brands under strong dominance.
dominance eliminates the range of consumers indexed on the interval [x0, x
B
1 ] in Figure 2. There-
fore, in equilibrium the dominant firm A is unable to induce switching because its poaching
activities would have to win consumers located much closer to firm B, hence to attract con-
sumers with low preference for brand A.
3.1 Weak dominance
In view of the utility function (1), the consumer who has purchased A before and is now indifferent
between being loyal to brand A and switching to brand B, denoted by xA1 , is implicitly determined
from β − pA − τxA1 = β − qB − τ(1 − xA1 ) − σ. Similarly, the consumer who has purchased B
before and is now indifferent between being loyal to brand B and switching to brand A, denoted
by xB1 , is implicitly determined from β − pB − τ(1− xB1 ) = β − qA − τxB1 − σ. Therefore,
xA1 =
1
2
+
qB − pA + σ
2τ
and xB1 =
1
2
+
pB − qA − σ
2τ
, (2)
define a new allocation of consumers between the brands as illustrated in Figure 2.
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In view of Figure 2, the profit functions of firms A and B are defined by
piA(pA, qA)
def
= (pA − c)xA1 + (qA − c)(xB1 − x0) (3)
piB(pB, qB)
def
= (pB − c)(1− xB1 ) + (qB − c)(x0 − xA1 ).
We now solve for the Nash equilibrium prices where firm A chooses pA and qA to maximize piA
and firm B chooses pB and qB to maximize piB. By substituting the market shares (2) into the
profit functions (3) we obtain the Nash equilibrium loyalty prices
pA = c+
τ(2x0 + 1) + σ
3
and pB = c+
τ(3− 2x0) + σ
3
, (4)
and poaching prices
qA = c+
τ(3− 4x0)− σ
3
and qB = c+
τ(4x0 − 1)− σ
3
. (5)
Observe from (4) that switching costs raise loyalty prices because firms can exploit the lock-in
effect generated by established business relationships. In contrast, (5) shows that switching costs
result in lower poaching prices because firms have to partially subsidize the costs in order to
induce switching.
Substituting the equilibrium prices (4) and (5) into (2) yields
xA1 =
τ(2x0 + 1) + σ
6τ
, and xB1 =
τ(2x0 + 3)− σ
6τ
. (6)
Assumption 1 guarantees that 0 < xA1 < x
B
1 < 1. Therefore, in view of Figure 2, the number of
switching consumers is xB1 − xA1 = (τ − σ)/(3τ).
We now compute the equilibrium market shares of firms A and B. From (6), in view of
Figure 2, the market share of the dominant firm is
mA1 = x
A
1 + (x
B
1 − x0) =
2− x0
3
< x0. (7)
Consequently, with history-based price discrimination, the market share of the dominant firm
decreases. The market share of the small firm is
mB1 = 1− xB1 + x0 − xA1 =
1 + x0
3
> 1− x0. (8)
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Intuitively, with inherited asymmetric market shares there is a tendency for the small firm to
defend its inherited customer relationships with more aggressive pricing (as seen by (4)). The
dominant firm loses market share. In this respect, history-based price discrimination does not by
itself induce persistent dominance unless it is combined with some additional sufficiently strong
strategic advantages.
3.2 Strong dominance
In Section 3.1 we focused on inherited weak dominance. We will now shift our attention to the
configuration with strong dominance as characterized in Definition 1. This would eliminate the
range of consumers indexed on the interval [x0, x
B
1 ] in Figure 2. Therefore, in equilibrium, the
dominant firm A is unable to induce switching because its poaching activities would have to win
consumers located much closer to firm B. Figure 3 illustrates this configuration.
To compute the equilibrium prices supporting the configuration illustrated in Figure 3, we set
firm A’s poaching price to equal marginal cost, qA = c. Comparing Figure 3 with Figure 2 reveals
that now xB1 = x0. Substituting qA = c and x
B
1 = x0 into (2), firm B’s best reply is to set
a loyalty price of pB = c + τ(2x0 − 1) + σ. Since consumers are segmented by their purchase
histories, the prices pA and qB remain unchanged. Altogether,
pA = c+
τ(2x0 + 1) + σ
3
, qA = c, pB = c+ τ(2x0 − 1) + σ, and
qB = c+
τ(4x0 − 1)− σ
3
. (9)
To prove that the prices (9) indeed constitute a Nash equilibrium we must demonstrate that
firm B cannot enhance its profit by raising its loyalty price pB. We substitute pA, qA, and qB
from (9) into (3) to obtain
∂piB
∂pB
∣∣∣∣
(9)
= −4x0τ + σ − 3τ
2τ
< 0 if and only if x0 >
3τ − σ
4τ
,
which by Definition 1 holds for the case of strong dominance.
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In view of Figure 3, the number of switching consumers is x0 − xA1 = [τ(4x0 − 1)− σ]/(6τ).
The resulting market shares are
mA1 = x
A
1 =
τ(2x0 + 1) + σ
6τ
< x0 and m
B
1 = 1−mA1 =
τ(5− 2x0)− σ
6τ
> 1− x0. (10)
From (10) we can draw the conclusion that the market share of the dominant firm is eroded under
history-based pricing. Thus, this feature holds true with inherited histories of strong dominance
as well as weak dominance.
4. Uniform Pricing
In this section we focus on competition with uniform pricing. Figure 4 below illustrates the market
shares when firms compete in uniform prices. Comparing Figure 4 with Figure 2 reveals that in
-
x00
x
A← A B → B
pA pB pBA B
1
h(x) = A h(x) = B -ﬀ-ﬀ
1
2
xu1
A→ B
Figure 4: Consumer allocation between horizontally-differentiated brands under uniform pricing.
the absence of price discrimination consumer switching may occur in one direction only. More
precisely, the small firm B may gain some consumers from the dominant firm, but not the other
way around. We now characterize this equilibrium.
In view of Figure 4, with only two prices, pA and pB, faced by all consumers, the utility of a
consumer indexed by x is now given by
U(x)
def
=

β − pA − τx if h(x) = A and continues to buy brand A
β − pB − τ(1− x)− σ if h(x) = A and now switches to brand B
β − pB − τ(1− x) if h(x) = B and continues to buy brand B.
(11)
Under uniform pricing, a consumer xu1 who is indifferent between being loyal to brand A
and switching to brand B is determined by β − pA − τxu1 = β − pB − τ(1 − xu1) − σ. Hence,
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xu1 = (pB− pA +σ+ τ)/(2τ). Firm A chooses a uniform price pA to maximize piA = (pA− c)xu1 .
Similarly, firm B chooses a uniform price pB to maximize piB = (pB − c)(1 − xu1). The unique
Nash-Bertrand equilibrium in prices and firm A’s market share are given by
puA = c+ τ +
σ
3
, puB = c+ τ −
σ
3
, and xu1 =
1
2
+
σ
6τ
>
1
2
, (12)
where superscript “u” indicates uniform pricing. From (12) we can directly observe that with
uniform prices the inherited dominance (captured by x0) has no effect on the price equilibrium.
Of course, in the presence of switching costs firm B must undercut A’s price with a margin
proportional to the switching costs in order to gain market share from A. Furthermore, in
equilibrium dominance persists as long as the there is some (even arbitrarily small) switching
cost.
To investigate how different pricing methods affect the degree of market dominance we com-
pare firm A’s market share under uniform pricing (12) with A’s market share under history-based
pricing (7) with weak dominance. This comparison yields xu1 − mA1 = (1 − x0)/3 > 0. This
implies the following result.6
Result 1. The equilibrium market share of the firm with inherited market dominance is always
larger under uniform pricing than under history-based pricing.
From Result 1 we can draw the conclusion that uniform pricing is more useful than history-based
pricing for the dominant firm as an instrument to defend dominance.
Another dimension of evaluation is to compare the equilibrium prices under uniform and
history-based price discrimination. Comparing (12) with (4) and (5), we find that puA − pA =
2τ(1 − x0)/3 > 0, puA − qA = 2(2x0τ + σ)/3 > 0, puB − qB = 4τ(1 − x0)/3 > 0. Also,
puB − pB = 2(x0τ − σ)/3 > 0 if σ/τ < x0 < (3τ − σ)/(4τ).
Based on these price comparisons we can conclude that competition with history-based pricing
generates lower prices than competition with uniform pricing with the potential exception of the
6The identical conclusion for inherited strong dominance can be reached in a straightforward way.
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loyalty price pB charged by the small firm. The small firm charges a higher price pB with history-
based pricing than with uniform pricing if the degree of inherited dominance is very weak, that
is, if x0 is close to 0.5, and if the switching costs are large, that is, σ is sufficiently close to τ .
5. Welfare Analysis
So far we have explored the effects of history-based price discrimination on prices and market
shares. We next investigate the welfare consequences of history-based price discrimination in
an asymmetric duopoly. Such an investigation is very important as a basis for a policy maker,
operating with a well-defined welfare objective, to formulate a policy towards history-based price
discrimination exercised by a dominant firm.
5.1 Comparing uniform pricing with history-based pricing under weak
dominance
Consumer surplus under uniform pricing is
CSu =
xu1∫
0
(β − puA − τx)dx+
x0∫
xu1
[β − puB − τ(1− x)− σ]dx+
1∫
x0
[β − puB − τ(1− x)]dx, (13)
where puA, p
u
B, and x
u
1 are given in (12).
Similarly, consumer surplus under history-based price discrimination is
CSd =
xA1∫
0
(β − pA − τx)dx+
x0∫
xA1
[β − qB − τ(1− x)− σ]dx
+
xB1∫
x0
[β − qA − τx− σ]dx+
1∫
xB1
[β − pB − τ(1− x)]dx, (14)
where pA, qA, pB, qB, x
A
1 , and x
B
1 are given in (4), (5), and (6).
Subtracting (13) from (14), our calculations show that
CSd − CSu = −τ
2(52x20 − 52x0 − 1) + 2στ(17− 18x0)− σ2
36τ
. (15)
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Let 0 ≤ s ≤ 1. Substituting σ = sτ into (15),
CSd − CSu = −τ [s
2 + 2s(18x0 − 17)− 52x20 + 52x0 + 1]
36
> 0 (16)
if
s < 17− 18x0 − 2
√
2
√
47x20 − 83x0 + 36 for
1
2
< x0 <
3
4
− s
4
. (17)
Figure 5 illustrates the sign of CSd − CSu in the (x0, s) space.
6
1
s
- x0
1
2
8− 5√2
11−√17
13
−
+ + +
+ + +
+ + +
3
4
− σ
4τ
Figure 5: Differences in consumer surplus.
Result 2. Under weak dominance, consumer surplus is higher with history-based price discrimi-
nation than with uniform pricing if and only if condition (17) holds.
In view of Figure 5, history-based price discrimination benefits consumers for most values of σ and
x0. However, for high switching cost σ (σ > 0.93τ) combined with a very low degree of inherited
dominance x0 (0.5 < x0 < 0.53) consumers are worse off under history-based price discrimination.
Consequently, unless faced with the particular combination of high switching cost (σ > 0.93τ)
and a very low degree of inherited dominance (0.5 < x0 < 0.53) a competition authority with
consumer welfare as its objective should not oppose to history-based price discrimination.
As our comparison of history-based prices and uniform prices in the previous section showed,
history-based price discrimination tends to yield lower prices than uniform pricing and therefore
consumers benefit from history-based pricing for most parameter combinations. However, we also
13
pointed out that the small firm charges a higher price pB with history-based pricing than with
uniform pricing if the degree of inherited dominance is very weak, that is, if x0 is close to 0.5,
and if the switching costs are large (σ is sufficiently close to τ). Under those circumstances when
condition (17) fails to hold the loyalty price charged by the small firm with history-based pricing
is so much higher than the uniform price that consumer surplus with uniform pricing exceeds that
with history-based price discrimination.
We now calculate the equilibrium profit of each firm under uniform pricing. Substituting (12)
into the profit under uniform pricing yields
piuA =
(3τ + σ)2
18τ
and piuB =
(3τ − σ)2
18τ
. (18)
Therefore, under uniform pricing, the profit advantage of the dominant firm is piuA−piuB = 2σ/3 >
0.
Next, we calculate the equilibrium profit of each firm under history-based pricing. Substituting
(4), (5), and (6) into (3) yields
pidA =
5τ 2(2x20 − 2x0 + 1) + 2στ(3x0 − 1) + σ2
9τ
and
pidB =
5τ 2(2x20 − 2x0 + 1) + 2στ(2− 3x0) + σ2
9τ
. (19)
Therefore, under history-based pricing, the profit advantage of the dominant firm is pidA − pidB =
2σ(2x0 − 1)/3 < 2σ/3. Hence, the profit advantage of the dominant firm is smaller under
history-based pricing compared with uniform pricing. Furthermore, from (18) and (19) we find
that aggregate industry profit is always higher under uniform pricing as can be seen from
(pidA + pi
d
B)− (piuA + piuB) =
τ 2(20x20 − 20x0 + 1) + 2στ + σ2
9τ
< 0. (20)
Consequently, firms have a mutual interest to compete in uniform prices rather than in prices
based on consumers’ purchase histories.
With the exception of very high switching cost (σ > 0.93τ) combined with a very low
degree of inherited dominance (0.5 < x0 < 0.53), history-based prices generate a distributional
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conflict between firms and consumers. We therefore evaluate whether the benefits to consumers
associated with history-based pricing exceed the firms’ profit loss.
We define social welfare as the sum of consumer surplus and firms’ profits, W = CS+piA+piB.
Under uniform pricing, social welfare is given by
W u =
5σ2 − 9τ 2 + 18τ(2β + σ − 2c− 2x0σ)
36τ
. (21)
Social welfare under history-based pricing is
W d =
2τ 2(7x20 − 7x0 − 1) + 2τ(9β − 9c− 2σ) + 5σ2
18τ
. (22)
Subtracting (21) from (22)) yields
W d −W u = τ
2(28x20 − 28x0 + 5) + 2στ(18x0 − 13) + 5σ2
36τ
. (23)
It can be easily established that (23) is strictly increasing with x0. Furthermore, W
d(x¯0) −
W u(x¯0) = −(9σ2 + 10στ − τ 2)/(144τ) < 0 for x¯0 = (3τ − σ)/(4τ), which is the upper bound
on x0 by Definition 1.
Result 3. Social welfare is higher under uniform pricing compared with history-based pricing.
With Hotelling competition, price changes generate a redistribution of surplus between consumers
and producers, whereas aggregate switching costs and transportation costs are “real” deadweight
losses to the economy. In order to understand the sources behind the total welfare gains associ-
ated with uniform pricing it is therefore valuable to highlight the effects of history-based pricing
on aggregate switching costs and transportation costs. With history-based pricing the number of
switching consumers is (x0− xA1 ) + (xB1 − x0), whereas the number of switching consumers with
uniform pricing is (x0−xu1). Based on (6) and (12) it can directly be verified that the number of
switching consumers with history-based pricing exceeds that associated with uniform pricing for
an inherited history with weak dominance. Therefore history-based price discrimination generates
higher aggregate switching costs than uniform pricing. Furthermore, with uniform pricing the
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switching also decreases the degree of preference mismatch, leading to lower aggregate trans-
portation costs as some consumers located to the right of 0.5 switch to B. With history-based
pricing the effect of switching on aggregate transportation costs is not a priori clear, because the
consumers switching from A to B face reduced transportation costs, whereas those switching
from B to A face increased transportation costs. Our total welfare comparison establishes an-
alytically that uniform pricing induces lower aggregate switching costs and transportation costs
than history-based price discrimination.
5.2 Comparing uniform pricing with history-based pricing under strong
dominance
Under strong dominance, consumer surplus with history-based pricing is
CSd =
xA1∫
0
(β − pA − τx)dx+
x0∫
xA1
[β − qB − τ(1− x)− σ]dx+
1∫
x0
[β − pB − τ(1− x)]dx, (24)
where pA, pB, qB, and x
A
1 are given in (9) and (10).
Subtracting (13) from (24), we find
CSd − CSu = (1− x0)[τ(16− 7x0)− 13σ]
9
> 0 if and only if
σ <
τ(16− 7x0)
13
with
3
4
− σ
4τ
< x0 < 1. (25)
Therefore,
Result 4. Under strong dominance, consumer surplus is lower with history-based price dis-
crimination than with uniform pricing if switching costs are sufficiently high, more precisely,
if σ > τ(16− 7x0)/13.
Comparing Result 4 with Result 2 we can conclude that the implications of history-based price dis-
crimination are sensitive to whether there is strong or weak dominance. In both cases, consumers
benefit from uniform prices when there are sufficiently high switching costs, but the switching
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cost threshold for this is much higher with weak dominance. With weak dominance consumer
surplus with uniform pricing exceeds that with history-based pricing if σ > 0.93τ , as the discus-
sion after Result 2 makes clear. According to Result 4 this threshold exceeds the threshold for
this to happen with inherited strong dominance.
Using (9) and (10), the equilibrium profit of each firm with history-based pricing under strong
dominance is
pidA =
[τ(2x0 + 1) + σ]
2
18τ
and pidB =
τ 2(46x0 − 20x2 − 17) + 2στ(10− 13x0) + σ2
18τ
. (26)
Comparing industry profit under history-based price discrimination (26) with industry profit under
uniform pricing (18) yields
(pidA + pi
d
B)− (piuA + piuB) =
(1− x0)[τ(8x0 − 17) + 11σ]
9
> 0 if and only if σ >
τ(17− 8x0)
11
.
(27)
Contrary to the case with weak dominance (20) , we now find that the adoption of history-based
price discrimination could be profit enhancing. This happens for sufficiently high switching costs.
Finally, similar to (23), the difference in social welfare is
W d −W u = −(1− x0)[τ(1− x0) + 2σ]
9
< 0. (28)
Therefore,
Result 5. Social welfare is higher under uniform pricing compared with history-based pricing.
Under history-based pricing the number of switching consumers is (x0−xA1 ), whereas this number
is (x0 − xu1) under uniform pricing. Based on (10) and (12) we can directly draw the conclusion
that behavior-based price discrimination generates higher aggregate switching costs than uniform
pricing. History-based pricing also leads to higher aggregate transportation costs with an inherited
history of strong dominance.
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6. Conclusion
We design an asymmetric Hotelling model with inherited market dominance in a duopolistic
industry where two firms, the dominant firm and the small firm, can price discriminate between
consumers based on their purchase history. We find that uniform pricing is more useful than
history-based pricing as an instrument for the dominant firm to defend its market share advantage.
We show that uniform pricing tends to soften price competition in the duopolistic industry leading
to higher industry profits under uniform pricing than under behavior-based price discrimination.7
We establish that consumers benefit from history-based price discrimination unless the switching
cost is sufficiently high and the inherited degree of dominance is sufficiently weak. Consequently,
unless the switching costs are sufficiently large and the inherited degree of dominance is sufficiently
weak a ban on history-based price discrimination would introduce a distributional conflict between
consumers and producers with the consumers as losers. Finally, we establish that the gains to
industry profits associated with uniform pricing exceed the associated losses to consumers.
Policy-related evaluations of price discrimination typically focus on whether this business
practice is abusive based on exclusionary or exploitative effects. Our analysis of the asymmetric
duopoly model implies that competition with history-based price discrimination typically tends
to intensify competition and thereby promote consumer welfare. In light of this conclusion our
analysis of consumer surplus tends to give no support for policies to ban history-based price
discrimination. However, at the same time our analysis reaches the unambiguous conclusion
that uniform pricing promotes total welfare. This means that concerns for industry profits will
eventually shift the policy recommendation in favor of banning history-based price discrimination.
To the extent increased industry profits facilitate increased investments and innovation such
concerns could even enhance future consumer surplus. Our model could be enriched to incorporate
such dynamic considerations.
When evaluating the antitrust implications of price discrimination an influential recent ap-
proach, including, for example, Innes and Sexton (1994) and Karlinger and Motta (2007), seems
7Uniform pricing always softens competition with an inherited history of weak dominance. This holds true also
with strong dominance as long as the switching cost is not too high.
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to persistently emphasize the following tradeoff. On the procompetitive side, for an oligopolistic
industry operating within a given market structure, price discrimination intensifies competition.
On the anticompetitive side, with price discrimination the dominant firm can induce exclusion
more effectively by targeting competitive price offers to limited market segments, which makes it
possible for the dominant firm to achieve exclusionary effects at lower costs. Our results regarding
the implications of history-based price discrimination for competition and welfare in an asymmet-
ric Hotelling model are perfectly consistent with this view as far as the procompetitive effect is
concerned. However, in light of the related analysis undertaken in Gehrig, Shy, and Stenbacka
(2010) of the effects of history-based price discrimination on entry, the results for the asymmetric
Hotelling model do not support this view as far as the exclusionary anticompetitive aspects are
concerned. In fact, as Gehrig, Shy, and Stenbacka (2010) make clear, with asymmetric Hotelling
competition the entry decision of a firm with no access to information about consumers’ pur-
chase histories is invariant to whether the incumbent implements history-based pricing or uniform
pricing. Furthermore, as far as the welfare implications are concerned consumers tend to benefit
from behavior-based price discrimination if also the small firm can apply behavior-based pricing,
whereas behavior-based pricing reduces consumer surplus if the dominant firm has exclusive access
to price discrimination, as Gehrig, Shy, and Stenbacka (2010) demonstrate. This finding suggests
that the welfare implications of history-based pricing are highly case-specific. Our analysis implies
that there is no simple and universal policy to deal with history-based pricing. Nevertheless, from
the point of view of topical European competition policy related to the application of Article 82,
our analysis has a very robust implication.
Our analysis offers strong support for an effects-based approach to the evaluation of history-
based price discrimination as a business practice, which could potentially qualify as abusive con-
duct if applied by a dominant firm. In this regard the analysis provides strong support in favor of
the effects-based approach suggested by Gual et al. (2006) to guide European antitrust policy.
Our analysis has been restricted to an asymmetric Hotelling model with the special feature
of inelastic demand at the industry level. Our general conclusion is that history-based pricing
tends to intensify competition within such a framework. This conclusion would be reinforced if
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we incorporate demand expansion effects, because the returns from the poaching activities would
then be further stimulated by the option of attracting new, unattached consumers. Thus, in
the presence of such demand effects the poaching incentives would be even stronger, thereby
promoting consumer welfare.
Throughout this study we have analyzed the implications of history-based pricing on the ability
of a dominant firm to maintain, or possibly strengthen, its dominance within the framework of a
limited horizon. Of course, from a theoretical perspective the strategic interaction between the
dominant firm and the weak firm could continue for many periods. Within such a framework
one could investigate the dynamics of dominance and, in particular, characterize the market
shares towards which the process would converge.8 Of course, such an analysis would quickly
be extremely complicated if the firms are able to maintain information on customer histories
consisting of several periods.9 Our present analysis could be viewed as imposing a restriction on
the firms so that these are able to maintain records of customer histories only for limited periods
of time.
It is worth relating our analysis also to another class of relevant studies about dynamic
pricing. For example, Caminal and Matutes (1990) derive equilibrium configurations where firms
offer loyalty discounts, and do not charge loyalty premia.10 An essential feature in that approach
is that lower prices are applied to loyal customers than to customers who switch supplier. In
this type of models loyalty discounts are a device to endogenously generate switching costs. An
essential feature in this type of models is that firms commit to the discount schedule upfront,
so that the consumers take this commitment into account when choosing with which supplier
to establish a business relationship. Thus, compared to our model this approach exhibits a
completely divergent intertemporal structure of the price equilibrium. It remains an interesting
challenge for future research to explore under which circumstances price commitments would and
8With respect to the dynamics of price equilibria and market shares Chen (2008) and Beggs and Klemperer
(1992) have made valuable contributions. The have not, however, conducted a welfare analysis to fully explore
the antitrust implications.
9A complete implementation of history-based pricing during T periods would split the market into 2T+1
segments, each with its own history-contingent price.
10Caminal and Claici (2007) have subsequently developed that analysis further.
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could emerge as an equilibrium outcome.
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